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This paper examines the welfare costs of inflation within a monetary dynamic general 
equilibrium framework with human capital that incorporates endogenous, ex ante skill 
heterogeneity among workers.  Numerical experiments indicate that, overall, welfare 
costs are more likely to decrease with increases in skill heterogeneity.  An implication of 
this feature is that a greater degree of skill heterogeneity may be associated with a higher 
tolerance for inflation, consequently implying a positive correlation between agent 
heterogeneity and inflation. Using a panel of several countries we empirically test this 














The impact of agents’ heterogeneity on the macroeconomic performance of an economy 
is central to a large and growing body of literature, and remains an open area of research. 
However, both in the inequality-growth literature and in the inequality-inflation literature, 
researchers have often focused on one aspects of agents’ heterogeneity, namely income 
inequality. For example, studies based on a political economy perspective of the 
inflation-income heterogeneity link provide a theoretical rationale for a positive as well 
as a negative correlation between the two aggregates.  By developing a theory of the 
determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies, Dolmas, Huffman and 
Wynne (2000), document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation.  
Bhattacharya, Bunzel and Haslag (2003), on the other hand, present a theory and 
empirical evidence that supports a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and 
inflation. Albanesi (2000) analyzes a model in which the poor are more vulnerable to 
inflation, and are the weaker party in the political process that determines inflation, 
leading to a positive inequality-inflation correlation.    
  In empirical studies on the effect of inequality of aggregate outcomes, the focus 
on one single dimension of agents’ heterogeneity, income inequality, has been motivated 
by the lack of suitable data. Because human capital inequality has been strongly 
emphasized as being an important determinant of income inequality, this has led to the 
common use of income inequality as a good proxy for human capital inequality.  See for 
example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Galor and 
Tsiddon (1997), among others.  However, recent evidence suggests that income and 
human capital distribution statistics can show very low correlations (Castello and 
Domenech, 2002).  In addition, Castello and Domenech (2002) also find that human 
capital inequality measures provide more robust results than income equality measures in 
the estimation of standard growth and investment equations. 
  This motivates our interest in an investigation of the relationship between human 
capital heterogeneity and inflation.  This paper considers the effect of the degree of skill-
heterogeneity among workers on the welfare costs of inflation. We address this issue in 
the framework of an equilibrium model with ex-ante heterogeneity of the type studied in 
Kydland (1984, 1995) and Prasad (1996), with money introduced via a cash-in-advance 
  1constraint on the purchases on consumption.  However, in our model, skill-heterogeneity 
is endogenous, and depends on the extent of human capital accumulation undertaken by 
the representative household. Specifically, the model of this paper suggests that the 
welfare costs of inflation are likely to decrease as skill heterogeneity increases.   
  The intuition underlying this interesting result can be briefly described as follows.  
In our model, and important parameter inversely representing heterogeneity is the 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled effort. The impact of inflation in 
cash-in-advance models involves substitution out of activities subject to the inflation tax, 
such as consumption and work effort, towards leisure.  Higher substitutability/low 
heterogeneity means that substitution out of skilled effort is possible to a greater degree 
than in the case of low substitutability/high heterogeneity.  Combined with the fact that 
the representative household values the leisure of the skilled worker more than that of the 
unskilled worker, inflation would entail a greater degree of substitution away from skilled 
effort.  As a result the other variables would also be adversely affected to a greater degree 
than in the case of high skill heterogeneity.  Welfare costs of inflation therefore tend to 
decrease with increases in heterogeneity. 
  To empirically test some of the implications of our model, we use a new panel 
data set of human capital inequality measures, created by Castello and Domenech (2002), 
to examine the inflation experiences of a large panel of countries between 1960 and 1989. 
We find that the implications of our model are broadly consistent with the empirical 
evidence on inflation and human capital heterogeneity. 
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the 
economic environment, and in Section 3 we briefly analyze the steady state.  The model 
is parameterized in Section 4, in which we also find welfare costs of inflation associated 
with different levels of skill heterogeneity.  The key implication of the quantitative 
experiments conducted in Section 4 is that welfare costs of inflation are inversely related 
to the degree of heterogeneity.  In Section 5 we test this implication using a panel of a 
number of countries.  If we focus on the experience of industrialized economies, which, 
as mentioned above, we believe our model to be more representative of, the data finds 
supports a positive inflation-heterogeneity correlation.  However, this is not true of less 
developed economies, in which the inflation heterogeneity correlation is found to be 
  2negative. Section 6 concludes.  A description of the numerical procedure used to solve for 
the steady state is presented in the Appendix, which also includes the proofs of some of 
the analytical results of Section 3. 
 
1.  The Economic Environment 
The economy is populated with a continuum of identical, infinitely lived households that 
are uniformly distributed along the unit interval [0, 1].  As in Kydland (1984, 1995), we 
assume that each household consists of two types of workers, skilled (type 1) and 
unskilled (type 2).  However, we make the further assumption that the productivity of the 
type 1 worker is endogenously determined by the household’s skill accumulation, as we 
will describe later.  Household preferences are given by 








where   represents household consumption in time t, and  represents labor effort at 
time t of type i agent, i=1, 2.  The functional form used for the momentary utility function 
is of the “indivisible labor” form as in Hansen (1985) and is given by 
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where  ψ and  ψ − 1  are the underlying weights assigned to the leisure of skilled and 
unskilled workers respectively.
1   
 Households  enter  period t with nominal money balances  , carried over from 
the previous period.  The government augments these money balances by a lump-sum 
transfer equal to the increase in money supply, where the aggregate money supply   is 
determined according the following rule: 
1 − t m
t M
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Thus the total amount of money balances held by a household at the beginning of period t 
is the amount 
                                                           
1Specifically skilled and unskilled workers can work some given positive number  or not at all, 
implying household consumption sets are non convex.  However, as in Hansen (1985) and Rogersen 
(1988), the household consumption set is made convex by allowing agents to trade employment lotteries.  
As in Prasad (1996), this economy has two independent employment lotteries, one for skilled workers and 
another for unskilled workers.  The expected utility of each household is then defined over total household 
consumption and the probability of employment of each type of worker. 
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To ensure that money is valued in equilibrium, we assume the presence of cash in 
advance constraint on the purchase of the non-storable consumption good.  Expenditure 
on the consumption good therefore cannot exceed the total money balances available to 
the household, i.e. 
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  In every period t, household expenditures consist of consumption  , 
investment in physical capital  , investment human capital ( ), and the amount of 
money balances 
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m  that are to be carried over to the next period.  These expenditures 
must not exceed total household income, which the sum of income is earned from skilled 
and unskilled labor, capital, money balances carried over from the previous period, and 
the lump-sum monetary transfer from the government.  Households therefore maximize 
expected lifetime utility subject to (5) and a sequence of budget constraints of the 
following form: 
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where household investment expenditure for physical and human capital in period-t is 
respectively given by 
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In equation (8)   and  respectively denote the household’s physical and human capital 
stock in period-t; 
t k t h
k δ  and   h δ  are the corresponding rates of depreciation. 
  The representative firm in this economy takes the average skill accumulation by 
the households as given, and hires labor  and physical capital  to produce  t N t K
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where   is an exogenous productivity shock that follows an AR (1) process of the form:  t z
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Here  1 + t ε  is i.i.d with zero mean and constant variance  .   
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In (10), the aggregate time-t labor input  is a CES function of skilled and unskilled 
labor, given by  
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 The elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is given by 
ν
1
. The function 
) ( t h ω captures the productivity of skilled labor, which is assumed to be increasing and 
concave, with  ) 0 ( ω = 1. Note that the degree of heterogeneity in this model is reflected in 
two parameters: a parameter that impacts directly on the skill differential between the two 
types of labor effort considered ) ( t h ω , and a parameter that describes the elasticity of 




  In addition, we make the assumption that the economy wide average stock of 
human capital equals the stock of human capital accumulated by the household, i.e., 
. t t H h =
2  The representative household therefore indirectly influences the relative wage 
rates of skilled and un-skilled labor and the rental rate of capital through its choice of 
human capital accumulation.  
  Taking that choice as given, the firm maximizes profits, which are equal to 
.  The optimality conditions for the firm’s problem yield the 
following functions for the skilled and unskilled wage rates, and the rental rate for 
capital:
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2With the exception of skill accumulation, capital letters denote aggregate economy wide per capita variables 
which an individual household regards as being outside its sphere of influence, while lower case letters denote variables 
specific to the household.   
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   For a value of g greater than one, both   and   will grow without bound.  In order 
to make the household’s problem stationary, some of the variables need to be 
transformed.  To that end, we define 










p = ˆ .    We can then state the 
household’s problem as follows: 
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the process for technology and monetary shocks, the aggregate capital accumulation rule, 
given by, 
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as well as the economy-wide aggregate decision rules perceived by the households: 
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3Since the aggregate production technology is of the Cobb-Douglas form, profits will be zero in equilibrium, even 
though aggregate labor effort is a CES function of skilled and unskilled labor.  This is easily verified by substituting the 
optimal wage and rental rates in the profit function. 
  6In equilibrium, aggregate per capita quantities turn out to be equal to the choices of the 
representative household.  In particular, it must be the case that  ,  t t N n = t t K k = , 
, and  .  Since the cash in advance constraint is assumed to be 
binding in equilibrium, we also have 
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3.  The Steady State 
  In this section we show that, since money is introduced in our model via a cash-
in-advance constraint, inflation has a negative has impact on the long-run outcomes of 
several variables, as is typically expected of such models.  Furthermore, consistent with 
some of the theoretical literature on the link between inflation and human capital, we find 
that inflation has a negative impact on human capital accumulation.
4  The degree of skill 
heterogeneity in our model has a further impact on the magnitude of distortions 
associated with inflation, as suggested by some of the analytical results of this section.  
The subsequent section, based on numerical experiments in fact indicates that it tends to 
weaken them.  Consequently, the welfare costs of inflation tend to decrease with an 
increase in heterogeneity. 
  In the non-stochastic steady state, the first order conditions with respect to 
 and equilibrium conditions for this economy imply:  , , , ˆ , , , 1 1 2 1 + + t t t t t t h k m n n c
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4For a survey, see Gillman and Kejak (2005). 
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Here  1 λ  and  2 λ  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the household budget and 
cash-in-advance constraints respectively.  From equation (27), which is the equilibrium 
version of the first order condition for capital, it is clear that the capital to “aggregate 
labor” ratio is independent of inflation, and is given by: 

























Of course, this is not the case for other variables, as a glance at the optimality conditions 
suggests. Manipulating (23)-(26) and (28) we can express other variables such as 
consumption and work-effort as functions of human capital: 
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H H .  Also note that for an 
interior solution to work effort, we need to impose  1 < ν .  Making the necessary 
substitutions in (29) we can then derive an implicit equation in human capital, given by: 
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Total differentiation of the above equation with respect to H and g yields a fairly 
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k , and the expressions 
) (H φ′  and  ) (H ω′  are partial derivatives of the respective functions with respect to H. 
How inflation impacts on consumption, work effort, physical and human capital is 
therefore difficult to discern analytically.  Nevertheless, if we impose some restrictions 
on parameter values and functional forms, it is possible to derive a few weak analytical 
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φ = .  Then  ) (H φ  can be regarded as the 
average contribution of skilled effort to aggregate effort.  Consequently, we can interpret 
  9φ Ω as the elasticity of this average contribution to changes in human capital investment. 
We can then summarize our analysis of equations (36) and (31)-(34) in the following 
propositions, the proof of which is presented in the appendix: 
 
Proposition 1: If   θ ν <  and  , 0 ) ( > ′ H φ  










Proposition 2: If the conditions of Proposition 1 hold and  φ ω νΩ > Ω ′ , 





(ii)  the sign of
dg
dN2  is ambiguous; 








      First let us consider the interpretation of the conditions  θ ν <  and  0 ) ( > ′ H φ  in 
Proposition 1.  The first of these places an upper limit on the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution between the two types of labor.  To interpret the second condition, again 





φ = , i.e.  ) (H φ  is the average contribution of skilled effort to the 
“aggregate” work effort in this economy. Then the condition  0 ) ( > ′ H φ  requires that this 
average contribution responds positively to changes in human capital accumulation.  In 
Proposition 2 the additional condition requires that the elasticity of the return to human 
capital investment be greater than the human capital elasticity of the average contribution 
of skilled effort to aggregate effort, multiplied by the factor ν , which is the inverse of the 
elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor. One can perhaps interpret the 
  10above Propositions as stating conditions under which inflation-tax distortions, as 
measured by the negative impact of inflation on human capital, skilled effort, and 
consumption, are important. However, one cannot conclusively say whether the 
associated welfare costs of inflation will be high or low; that would depend, additionally, 
on the magnitude of the response of variables to increases in the inflation rate.   
Nevertheless, it should be intuitively clear that experiments varying the heterogeneity 
parameters will impact on inflation tax distortions, (and consequently the welfare costs of 
inflation) in interesting ways.  In the subsequent section on numerical experiments we 
will therefore use the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 to assist in the interpretation of 
our results.    
        Note, however, that the conditions in the above proposition are only sufficient 
conditions for the response of human capital, consumption, and other variables to be 
negative. Numerical simulations conducted and discussed in more detail in the following 
section indicate that, as is typical in models with a cash-in-advance constraint on 
consumption purchases, consumption, and work effort, physical and human capital are 
negatively related to the growth rate of money even when some of the above mentioned 
conditions do not hold.  Interestingly, higher inflation is also shown to be associated with 
a shift in the percentage composition of the “work force” between skilled and unskilled 
labor.   
      The intuition for the negative impact of inflation on economic aggregates is 
straightforward, and common to several cash-in-advance models in the literature.   
Inflation acts as a tax on consumption since it requires the use of cash.  This leads 
economic agents to substitute consumption for activities that do not require the use of 
cash, such as leisure.  The decline in work effort causes a decline in output, and 
consequently consumption, investment and the physical and human capital stock.   
However, it is also intuitively clear that the magnitude of the negative response to 
inflation in this economy is likely to be affected significantly by the parameters of the 
functions  ) (H ω and  ) (H φ . Specifically, varying  ψ ν,  or α , which can be interpreted 
parameters affecting the extent of ex ante heterogeneity in this economy, has an impact 
on the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2, and consequently the magnitude of the 
distortions associated with inflation.  It is then natural to expect that welfare costs 
  11computations relative to an optimal monetary policy may yield significantly different 
results as we allow some of these parameters to vary.  In the next section, we therefore 
derive some conclusions regarding welfare costs based on numerical experiments using a 
plausibly parameterized version of the model. 
 
4. Inflation and Skill Heterogeneity: Results Based on Quantitative Experiments 
In this section, we explore the relationship between inflation and heterogeneity, by 
examining how long-run aggregate outcomes and welfare costs of inflation change as we 
vary the levels of the parameters that capture heterogeneity.  First we 
specify , so that the parameters relevant to the degree of 
heterogeneity are 
1 0 ; 1 ) ( < < + = α ω
α H H
, ,ψ α and ν .The remaining parameters, viz  a h k , , , , δ δ θ β  and g are 
taken directly from relevant papers in the equilibrium business cycle literature, such as 
Hansen (1985) and Cooley and Hansen (1989), Lahiri (2002), and Canton (2002).  The 
range of values for the parameter ν  includes the value 0.4 chosen in the Prasad (1996). 
The values for α  are chosen such that the productivity differential is around “2 or 
higher” as suggested in Kydland (1995).  The parameter ψ , even though it can be 
interpreted as a parameter representing heterogeneity, is however fixed at 0.59, the value 
chosen in Prasad (1996).  The reason for doing so will be discussed below, with reference 
to the measure of welfare cost considered in this paper. The other fixed parameters are 
given by the following: 99 . = β ; 36 . = θ ; 025 . = k δ ; 00375 . = h δ ; 86 . 2 = a  
  The numerical procedure used to calculate the steady state is described in the 
appendix.  To compute welfare costs of inflation, we calculate the increase in 
consumption that an individual would require to be as well off under the equilibrium 






* ) 1 ( )) 1 ( ( log n n x c U ψ ψ − − − + = , where   are levels of 





* , , n n c
1 > g U  is 
the utility attained under the optimal policy which sets  β = g .  We calculate this loss, 
expressed as a percentage of output and also of consumption, for varying levels of each 
of the heterogeneity parameters.  Note that since ψ  is a preference parameter, it 
  12obviously affects the measure of welfare costs itself.  An experiment that considers the 
effects of varyingψ  on welfare costs of inflation is therefore inappropriate.  
   Table 1 below presents the steady state values of variables and associated welfare costs 
of inflation as the monetary growth rate increases, with the heterogeneity parameters 
fixed at  59 . 0 ; 4 . 0 ; 1 . 0 = = = ψ ν α . Figures 1(a) and 1(b) present the steady state values 
of variables as ν  increases.  The ‘x’ line represents the policy with inflation ( ) 
and the dotted line represents the optimal policy (
15 . 1 = g
β = g ).  Figure 1(c) presents welfare 
costs of inflation as ν  increases. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) present the percentage difference 
in the steady state values of variables in the presence of inflation, relative to their steady 
state levels when  β = g , for different values of ν .  Figure 2(c) presents the elasticity 
 and the weighted elasticity  ω′ Ω φ ν Ω  for different values of ν , where the ‘*’ line 
represents the latter.  Figures 3(a)-(c) and Figures 4(a)-(c) present similar experiments 
with the parameter α . 
  First, we examine the computations presented in Table 1.  As mentioned above, 
the heterogeneity related parameters in this case are fixed at  59 . 0 ; 4 . 0 ; 1 . 0 = = = ψ ν α , 
and the monetary growth rates are set at  β = g ,  ; 05 . 1 ; 024 . 1 = = g g  and  .  The 
usual features of cash-in-advance models are apparent: inflation impacts negatively on 
consumption, work effort, physical and human capital, and output.
15 . 1 = g
 5  The composition of 
work effort, however, seems to shift slightly in favor of unskilled labor as inflation 
increases, perhaps due to the relatively higher weight assigned to leisure of the skilled 
type.  In a quantitative sense, the magnitudes of welfare costs are higher than would be 
observed in a model without endogenous skill heterogeneity or human capital, such as in 
Cooley and Hansen (1989). 
   Next we examine the effects of varying the heterogeneity parameters and how this 
variation impacts on the magnitude of distortions associated with inflation.  First consider 
Figures 1(a) and (b).  The response of variables to changes in ν  appears similar 
regardless of the monetary policy in operation, and the magnitude of the negative impact 
of inflation does not look very striking.  The magnitude of the inflation-tax distortions is, 
however, difficult to discern from these figures and we therefore defer the discussion of 
                                                           
5 In a qualitative sense, these results hold for other combinations of the heterogeneity parameters as well. 
  13these distortions until the analysis of Figures 1(c) and (d).
6  First, we attempt to gain 
some intuition for how changes in ν  affect the long run values of economic aggregates in 
general, regardless of what the inflation rate is.  Increasing ν , which is the inverse of the 
elasticity of substitution between different types of labor, amounts to increasing skill 
heterogeneity in this economy along two dimensions?  One dimension is associated with 
the falling elasticity of substitution – heterogeneity increases in the sense that the two 
types of labor are substitutable to a lower degree in the production process.  Secondly, it 
is clear from Figure 1(a) that the equilibrium composition of the work force becomes 
more heterogeneous as ν  increases.  For high substitutability the work force comprises 
almost entirely of the skilled type of labor, but as the elasticity of substitution increases, it 
becomes more heterogeneous.  Also, lower substitutability encourages investment in 
human capital; to the extent that the more expensive type of effort is used, it would be 
more economical to employ it if its marginal return were higher – and human capital 
accumulation ensures this.  This is also reflected in the increasing skill differential as ν  
increases.  Higher levels of human capital increase the overall productivity of all inputs, 
and consequently, we see in Figure 1(b) that both the skilled and unskilled wage rates 
increase.  Higher productivity also encourages physical capital accumulation.  As a result, 
output and consumption also increase. 
   An interesting feature of Figure 1(a) is the inverted U-shaped response of skilled and 
unskilled work effort.  This feature can probably be explained by the same rationale used 
to interpret backward-bending labor supply curves.  Initially, as the wage rate increases, 
the substitution effect dominates the income effect and work effort increases.  After a 
certain level the income effect takes over and the demand for leisure increases. 
   So far, we have not considered how inflation-tax distortions are affected as ν  increases.  
From Figures 1(a) and (b) it is easy to discern the negative impact of inflation we 
discussed earlier.  However, we cannot comment on the magnitude of these distortions 
until we discuss the percentage differences in the levels of variables relative to the case in 
which the optimal policy prevails.  These differences are shown in Figures 2(a) and (b).  
                                                           
6 The size of the differences is relatively small in comparison to the length of the scale of the vertical axis 
in all of the graphs.  However, as will become clear from the analysis of percentage deviations relative to 
the optimal policy, presented in Figures 2(a) and (b), these differences can be quite significant. 
 
  14However, before we discuss Figure 2, we consider the overall measure of inflation tax 
distortions, as represented by the welfare cost of inflation defined earlier.  Figure 1(c) 
presents such welfare cost computations for different values of ν .  It is clear that the 
welfare cost of inflation, relative to both consumption as well as output decreases as ν  
increases.  In other words, welfare costs of inflation decrease as heterogeneity increases. 
   In order to interpret this result we turn to Figures 2(a), (b), and (c).  Recall that  θ ν < , 
0 ) ( > ′ H φ , and  φ ω ν Ω > Ω ′  were some of the conditions stated in Propositions 1 and 2.  
For the functional form of the productivity function considered in this paper it is easy to 
check that  ) 1 ( − − = Ω ′ α ω .  Since we do not vary α  in this experiment, the horizontal 
line in Figure 2(c) at 0.9 represents this elasticity.  The upward sloping ‘ *’ line 
represents  φ ν Ω .  Furthermore, it is easy to read the sign of  ) (H φ′  from this figure as 
0 ) ( 0 > ′ > Ω H iff φ ν φ .  Obviously, the conditions  θ ν < and  0 ) ( > ′ H φ  do not 
appear to hold simultaneously for this experiment, while the condition φ ω ν Ω > Ω ′  does 
not hold for values of ν  greater than 0.4.  As mentioned above these were only sufficient 
conditions for the impact of inflation to be negative and numerical experiments 
confirmed that the impact of inflation on all of the variables in this model is negative, 
even when the said conditions do not hold?  However, some of these conditions 
particularly  θ ν <  appear to be of some importance in determining the magnitude of 
inflation tax distortions in this economy.   For example, note that in Figure 2(a) and (b) 
the largest distortions, measured in terms of the percentage deviation from the optimal 
level of the variables in question, appear to be for values of ν  much smaller than θ .  As 
ν  increases past this range, the decline in welfare costs is more gradual.  The other 
conditions do not seem to be playing a significant role in the sense that they do not 
correlate strongly with the magnitude of distortions shown in the figures. 
   Why are inflation tax distortions high for smaller values of ν ?  The answer to this 
question may be related to the fact that the impact of inflation in cash-in-advance models 
involves substitution out of activities subject to the inflation tax, such as consumption and 
work effort, towards leisure.  Higher substitutability in the lower range of values for ν  
means that substitution out of skilled effort is possible to a greater degree in this case.  
Combined with the fact that the representative household values the leisure of the skilled 
  15worker more than that of the unskilled worker (since  59 . 0 = ψ ), inflation would entail a 
greater degree of substitution out of skilled effort.  As a result the other variables would 
also be adversely affected to a greater degree than in the case of low substitutability. 
   The other condition that may be of some relevance is  φ ω ν Ω > Ω ′ ; one can perhaps 
assert that the distortions to the left of  4 . 0 = ν ,where this condition holds, are larger than 
the distortions beyond this value.  The left hand side of this inequality can be interpreted 
as a factor of importance in of the “supply side” of the skill accumulation decision; one 
would expect a larger leftward shift in supply of human capital in response to the 
inflation tax if the elasticity of its marginal return was large.
  7  The “demand side” 
response, on the other hand, depends on the human capital elasticity of the average 
contribution of skilled effort to aggregate effort, appropriately weighted by the inverse of 
the elasticity of substitution.  If  φ Ω is negative and large, the average contribution of 
skilled effort increases when human capital accumulation falls in response to the inflation 
tax.  The demand for skilled effort may increase due to this increase in average 
productivity or alternatively, fall given that a smaller amount of skilled effort may be 
needed in the production process.  When there is high substitutability, the extent of shifts 
in demand may not be too large and the corresponding weight assigned to this elasticity is 
low.  In any case, our numerical experiments suggest that the supply side response of 
work effort dominates and the overall impact is negative.  For larger values of ν ,  φ Ω  
increases and becomes positive.  This means that the average contribution of skilled 
effort decreases when human capital accumulation falls.  Again, demand may fall or rise 
depending on the extent to which skilled effort is needed relative to the decline in its 
average productivity.  The scenario in which inflation tax distortions weaken is when the 
demand shifts positively to counter the leftward shift in supply so that equilibrium skilled 
effort does not fall too much.  Re-examining the percentage differences in skilled effort 
and unskilled effort relative to the optimal case in Figure 2(a), there is evidence to 
suggest that this interpretation may be plausible.    
                                                           
7  Recall that the marginal return is assumed to be decreasing in human capital.  As the inflation tax 
encourages a reduction in human capital accumulation the marginal return to it would increase as a result.  
If the elasticity of this marginal return is high, a greater extent of substitution out of skilled leisure is 
possible, thus enhancing the negative response of skilled effort to increases in inflation. 
  16   We now turn to the discussion of experiments that vary α .  First we interpret the 
changes in the steady state variables in Figures 3(a) and (b) as α  is increased from 0.05 
to 0.35.  Higher α  represents a higher marginal return to human capital, and therefore a 
greater steady state level of human capital.  As a result, the skill differential increases, as 
does the productivity of skilled and unskilled effort leading to increases in wage rates.  
Physical capital also increases as it is more productive when higher levels of human 
capital are used in the production process.  The increase in output and consumption is 
another obvious implication of the increase inα .  The income effect of wage increases 
appears to dominate the substitution effect in this case; both skilled and unskilled effort 
decline as α increases. 
    Looking at the welfare cost estimates in Figure 3(c), we find that welfare costs of 
inflation relative to consumption increase very gradually, while welfare costs relative to 
output increase and then decrease.  Note that the magnitude of changes in this case is 
very small.  To interpret these changes, we examine Figures 4(a) and 4(b).  In this case ν  
is fixed at its calibrated value of 0.4, so the condition  θ ν <  is not satisfied for this 
experiment.   The size of the difference relative to the optimal policy, shown in Figures 
4(a) and (b), seems to increase monotonically for most variables, except for work effort 
and human capital accumulation.  From Figure 4(c), we see that  φ ω ν Ω > Ω ′  holds for a 
small range of relatively low values of α ,  while  0 ) ( > ′ H φ holds for values of α greater 
than or equal to 0.1.  The work effort response appears consistent with the interpretation 
given earlier with reference to the experiment with variations in ν . 
   Now the welfare cost measure, which is by definition the consumption compensation 
you have to give the representative household to make it as well off in terms of utility as 
in the case when the optimal policy is in place, is directly affected by the variables that 
enter the utility function – consumption and leisure.   In absolute levels, this 
compensation obviously has to increase as α  increases.  This is because, as is clear from 
Figures 4(a) and (b), the percentage difference in consumption levels relative to the 
optimal policy increases withα , while the percentage difference in leisure decreases with 
α .  Expressed relative to consumption or output, however, welfare costs may increase or 
decrease, depending on how fast output or consumption increase as α  increases.  This is 
what seems to be happening in Figure 3(c); welfare costs relative to consumption 
  17increase very gradually, while welfare costs relative to output increase and then decrease.  
In fact, in simulations for higher values of α , not reported here, the welfare costs of 
inflation relative to consumption also start to decrease as α  increases. 
   The intuition underlying these results is as follows.  Both types of work effort are 
decreasing in inflation, but an increase in the productivity differential offsets the output 
loss associated with a given rate of inflation.  In a relative sense, therefore, the welfare 
costs of inflation are nor likely to be high. 
   Overall, we may conclude that high levels of heterogeneity are likely to be associated 
with lower welfare costs of inflation.  An implication of this result is that economies in 
which agents are characterized by a higher degree of heterogeneity experience lower 
costs of inflation, and as such are likely to experience higher inflation rates.  In other 
words, skill heterogeneity could contribute toward explaining variations in the inflation 
experiences of different countries at any given point in time.  The scope of the next 
section is to empirically estimate the correlation between inflation and skill 
heterogeneity. 
 
5.  Inflation and Skill Heterogeneity:  An Empirical Analysis 
In order to test whether agents’ heterogeneity indeed affects the policy maker’s decision 
over the optimal inflation level we compare the experiences of a number of countries 
over a period of time starting in 1960 and ending, in our most comprehensive case, in 
2000. Our empirical strategy is to control for differences in institutional arrangements 
across countries so as to shed light on the correlation between human capital inequality 
and inflation. The data on inflation are drawn from The International Financial Statistics 
published by the International Monetary Fund. The sample comprises 108 countries, of 
which 33 are defined as developed economies (LDC = 0) and 44 are defined by 
Cukierman and Webb (1995) as democracies (dummy for authoritarian regime=0). 
However, the number of countries actually used in the estimation procedure is much 




  185.1 The Explanatory Variables. 
The type of heterogeneity at work in the theoretical model is correlated with agents’ 
productivity, and affects the agents’ substitutability in the production process. A natural 
candidate for a measure of such heterogeneity is human capital inequality. Differences in 
human capital attainment indeed produce heterogeneity that affects productivity, and the 
substitutability between agents in addition to the value assigned to non-working 
activities. Data for agents’ heterogeneity are provided by Castello and Domenech (2002) 
and refer to human capital inequality. Using the recent information contained in Barro 
and Lee’s (2001) data set about educational attainments, Castello and Domenech 
calculate a human capital Gini coefficient  where  is the Lorenz 
curve of the  educational attainment distribution. The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative 
percentage of educational attainment (human capital) reached by the bottom y-percent of 
the population. The Gini coefficient is a measure of human capital inequality that ranges 
from zero to one: in the case of perfectly equal distribution the Lorenz curve would 
coincide with the 45-degree lines and the Gini coefficient would be zero. Castello and 
Domenech (2002) propose two Gini coefficients, namely G25, the Gini coefficient 
computed using the population aged 25 and plus, and G15, the Gini coefficient computed 
using the population aged 15 and plus. While for the most part we will use the former, we 
will use the latter to check the robustness of our results. Both measures of human capital 
inequality are available for all 108 countries in the data set at times of 5-year interval 
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  It is now well established that the conduct of monetary policy and specifically the 
rate of growth of the money stock is the primary factor determining a country’s inflation 
rate. The actual policy pursued by the monetary authority depends on a number of factors 
some of which have an exquisitely political flavor. For instance there is now a large body 
of literature that relates central banks’ decisions to their independence from, or 
vulnerability to, political pressure, which may work to deviate the central bank’s attention 
from the pursuit of a price stability goal (e.g., Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992; 
Cukierman and Webb, 1995). The other variables we include in our data set reflect this 
type of argument. The measures of Central Bank independence (CBI), central bank 
  19vulnerability (vulnerability) and political instability (political change) come from the 
Cukierman and Webb (1995) data set. The CBI variable measures legal independence of 
central bank from political power. Cukierman et al., (1992) code central bank 
independence following two main principles. First of all, they code only a few narrow but 
relatively precise legal characteristics. Secondly, they only use the written information 
from central banks’ charters. The legal characteristics as described in the charters define a 
few important issues, namely:  
(i) the appointment, dismissal and term of office of the central bank’s chief officer; 
(ii) the policy formulation cluster and the resolution of possible conflicts over monetary 
policy between monetary and fiscal authorities; 
(iii) the objectives of the central bank; 
(iv) limitations on the ability of the central bank to lend to the public sector and 
regulation of the modalities with which such lending can take place. 
The way the single components of central bank’s legal independence are aggregated is 
fully described in Cukierman et al., (1992). 
  The Cukierman-Webb (1995) vulnerability variable takes its origin from raw data 
on the actual dates of changes of the governors of the central banks. To measure central 
bank vulnerability to political instability, Cukierman and Webb estimate the probability 
per month of a change in central bank governor conditional on being a time interval that 
follows a political transition. They show that although this probability decreases 
monotonically with the number of months that have elapsed since the last political 
transition, the estimated probability of a change in governor at the central bank is more 
than two times larger in periods within six months after a political transition than in 
periods that are more removed from political change. They then compute an index of the 
political vulnerability of the central bank (vulnerability), defined for each country in the 
Cukierman-Webb (1995) sample as the fraction of political transitions that are followed 
with a lag of 0 to 6 months by a replacement of the central bank governor. Cukierman 
and Webb (1995) illustrate that the highest level of central bank vulnerability occurs in 
the face of high level political transitions, which is then included among the explanatory 
variables. 
  20  The last variable we include is the degree of openness (openness) of an economy 
to the rest of the world. We measure this as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports 
over a country’s GDP. The argument is that the degree of exposure to international trade 
may increase the ability of a central bank to pre-commit to a given (low) inflation target.  
  The Cukierman-Webb variables described above are available for 67 countries 
from 1950 to 1989 although data for economies that achieved political independence or 
established a central bank after the 1950 start later. The Cukierman-Webb data set 
includes all the major industrial and developing economies, but excludes most Easter 
European countries. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the main variables. 
5.2 The Empirical Specification. 
We estimate a model of the form 
                                            ) 37 ( it i it it x ε η β α π + + + =  
where  it π  is the inflation measure in country i in time t,  is a set of explanatory 
variables specific to country i in time t and 
it x
it i ε η +  is the residual. We are interested in 
estimating the βs. While the error component  it ε has the usual properties (mean zero, 
uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with the vector x), the characteristics of the error 
component  i η  define the estimation strategy we will adopt. In particular, given the 
extreme heterogeneity of inflation experiences we observe in our sample, and the extreme 
differences of the institutional features of the countries considered, we opt for treating the 
country specific error component,  i η , as a fixed effect rather than a random variable. 
This amounts to estimating the following equation, 
                             ) 38 ( ) ( i it i it i it x x ε ε β α π π − + − + = −  
where  T
t it i / ∑ = π π ,  T x x
t it i / ∑ = ,  T
t it i / ∑ = ε ε .  In the actual estimation the 
dependent variable has been transformed to reduce heteroskedasticity of the error and 
thus improve the efficiency of the estimate. Also, since a few countries had three-digit 
inflation rates in some years, using the untransformed inflation rate as a dependent 






D  as the dependent variable, as in Cukierman et al., (1992, 1995). The variable D 
takes a value from zero to one. 
5.3 The empirical results. 
We begin by reproducing some of the results from the previous literature using our data 
set. In this way the actual impact of human capital inequality on inflation will be better 
evaluated. When the dependent variable D is regressed on openness only, using a FE 
estimator or simply OLS on the pooled cross-section observations, the openness 
coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant, a results often highlighted in 
the empirical literature (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1995). The FE coefficient and standard error 
of openness is reported below 
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The negative correlation between openness and inflation is robust to the inclusion of CBI 
among the explanatory variables, although it becomes statistically non-significant when 
variables representing the vulnerability of the central bank and high-level political change 
are included among the regressors. 
  The degree of independence of the central bank from political pressure CBI has 
often been found to have positive although a hardly statistically significant effect on 
inflation. Using our full sample we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
in the OLS and FE regressions. The CBI coefficients turn statistically non-significant and 
negative in the case of developed democracies for which the FE regression results are as 
follows 
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  For this very restricted group of countries the OLS estimate of CBI is negative 
and highly statistically significant, a result that reproduces the one found by Cukierman et 
al., (1992). 
  Our new empirical results are illustrated in tables 3-5. Table 3 reports the Fixed 
Effect estimation results obtained by using the full sample to estimate equation (38). The 
left hand side panel illustrates results where the dependent variable is D, while in the 
  22right hand side panel the dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of the 
inflation rate π. The Gini coefficient computed using the population of those aged 25 and 
over is consistently negative and statistically significant. The sign of these estimates 
suggests that countries where agents are differently endowed with human capital tend to 
have better inflation records, once we keep constant those institutional factors that may 
impact upon the commitment to price stability. However, this suggested link between 
human capital inequality and inflation does not consistently apply to all countries. For 
instance, Table 4 illustrates the Fixed Effect estimation results obtained by splitting the 
sample in Non-Authoritarian and Authoritarian regimes, left hand side panel and right 
hand side panel, respectively, of Table 4. When such a distinction is made we notice that 
the negative correlation between G25 and inflation does not hold for Authoritarian 
regimes where a mildly statistically significant positive correlation between these two 
variables emerges. 
  The results illustrated in Table 5 further illustrates that the relationship between 
human capital inequality and inflation may depend on other features of the economy that 
are broadly captured by the dummy variable for the state of development. For Less 
Developed Countries (LDC=1) we again find the negative correlation between the Gini 
coefficient of the human capital distribution and inflation we initially found in the full 
sample estimates. However, in a sample of more developed countries (LDC=0) we find 
that human capital inequality increases inflation, a result that can be explained by our 
model where human capital inequality decreases the welfare costs of inflation thus 
opening a space where the commitment to price stability may be relaxed. 
  Note that these results are robust to (i) changes in the dependent variable (as 
illustrated in table 3 above), (ii) changes in the population used to compute the human 
capital inequality measure (G15 rather than G25). Also in most cases the use of OLS as 
an estimation technique does not radically change the results.  For instance our OLS 
estimates for Central Bank vulnerability (vulnerability), which reproduce the results by 
Cukierman and Webb (1995), are not dramatically altered when the Gini measure of 
human capital inequality is included among the regressions. In such a regression the G25 
variable has a negative, mildly statistically significant coefficient, which appears to be 
  23consistent with our FE estimates reproduced in table 3. (These results are available upon 
request). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this paper was to examine the link between skill heterogeneity and the 
costs of inflation.  This issue was addressed within a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework that incorporated ex-ante, endogenous skill heterogeneity among workers.   
Numerical experiments based on a plausible parameterization of this model indicate that 
welfare costs of inflation relative to an optimal monetary policy are likely to decrease as 
skill heterogeneity increases.  An implication of this feature is that a greater degree of 
skill heterogeneity would be associated with a greater tolerance for inflation, 
consequently implying a positive correlation between agent heterogeneity and inflation.  
An empirical study based on a panel of several countries lends some support to this 
hypothesis.  If we focus on the experience of industrialized economies, the data supports 
a positive inflation-heterogeneity correlation.  On the other hand, this is not true of less 
wealthy economies, in which the inflation-heterogeneity correlation if found to be 
negative.  However, the model economy we study in this paper, and its parameterization, 
is representative of developed economies, and to that end is only capable of explaining 
the long run or cyclical features of such economies.  We may therefore interpret the 
results as supportive of the theoretical implications of our model. 
 
Appendix. 
A. Proof of Proposition 1. 
 It is easy to check that the numerator of the expression for 
dg
dH
 is positive.  The sign of 
dg
dH
 therefore depends on the sign of the denominator.  Note that the parameters   and 
 are positive.  Given that we have assumed 
1 Δ
2 Δ 0 ) ( < ′ ′ H ω , it is then clear that the sign of 
the denominator will be negative if  θ ν <  and  . 0 ) ( > ′ H φ   To see that  0 <
dg
dC
, we take 
the total derivative of equation (30) and obtain 
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The first term is obviously negative.  Since 
dg
dH
 is negative, and the term inside the 
brackets is positive under our assumptions, part (ii) of the proposition follows. 
B. Proof of Proposition 2. 
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− .  Multiplying both sides by H, this amounts to φ ω νΩ > Ω ′ . 
   Also,  .
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The first term on the right hand side is positive since
dg
dH
is negative. The second term is 




, i.e. if φ ω νΩ > Ω ′ .  Overall the sign of 
dg
dN 2 is ambiguous.  Also note 
that 
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and, 




dK θ κ = . 
It is easy to check that parts (iii) and (iv) of the propositions follow from the given 
assumptions. 
 
  25C. Numerical Procedure  
The numerical procedure used to solve for the steady state of the model involves the 
construction of a “grid” of values for human capital, and searching this grid for a value 
that satisfies equation (35).  Once this is found, equations (30)-(34) can be used to find 
the steady state values of other variables.  Results are accurate up to three decimal places. 
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  27Table 1: Steady state values as  g increases. 
  β = g (Optimal 
Policy) 
024 . 1 = g   05 . 1 = g   15 . 1 = g  
Human  capital  10.7655 10.3780 10.0995 9.1495 
Consumption  2.3580 2.2796 2.2230 2.0294 
Skilled effort 
  1 N
.1455 .1408 .1375 .1260 
Unskilled effort 
  2 N










N   24.98 24.37 24.44 24.69 
Aggregate 
effort(N) 
.8708 .8417 .8208 .7492 
Capital  stock  33.0794 31.9772 31.1833 28.4630 
Output 3.2253 3.1179 3.0405 2.7752 
Skill 
differential 
2.2682 2.2636 2.2602 2.2478 
Skilled  wages  11.0004 10.9714 10.9499 10.8727 
Unskilled 
wages 
7.6444 7.6242 7.6093 7.5556 
Utility  .7529 .7223 .6995 .6165 
Welfare cost  0  .0136  .0548  .1461 
Welfare cost as 
% of 
consumption 
0 1.36  2.46  7.20 
Welfare cost as 
% of output 
0 1.00  1.80  5.27 
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  29Figure 1(a): Steady State Values of Variables as ν increases  
Optimal Policy ( β = g )        . 













  30Figure 1(b): Steady state values of variables as ν increases  
Optimal Policy ( β = g )        . 















































  33Figure 2(b): Percentage difference relative to the optimal policy as ν varies. 
 
Figure 2(c): Elasticities  and  ω′ Ω φ ν Ω  as ν  varies. 
 
  34Figure 3(a): Steady state values of variables as α increases  
 
Optimal Policy ( β = g )        . 













  35Figure 3(b): Steady state values of variables as α increases  
Optimal Policy ( β = g )        . 













  36Figure 3(c):  Welfare costs of inflation as α increases. 
 
Figure 4(a): Percentage change relative to optimal policy as α varies. 
 




Figure 4(c): Elasticities  and  ω′ Ω φ ν Ω  as α  varies. 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics for the main variables 
Variable name  Obs.  Mean  Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 







100 0.11  0.09  0.03  0.52 
G25 105  0.48  0.24  0.13  0.94 
G15 108  0.45  0.23  0.11  0.91 
Openness 98  66.2  42.9  10.9  243.0 
CBI 57  0.34  0.12  0.12  0.69 
Vulnerability 56  0.29  0.31  0  1.28 
High-level pol. 
change 
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D  in the left hand panel and logπ  in the right hand panel, 
where π  is the inflation rate.  Fixed Effect Estimation results. 
Explain. 
variables 
Inflation is D, FE 1960-2000  Inflation is logπ , FE 1960-
2000 
Gini (pop. 25+)  -0.14**
  -0.36** -0.44** -1.94**  -4.71** -
6.27*** 
  (0.06) (0.15) (0.16) (0.66) (1.61)  (1.64) 
Openness  ---- ---- 0.001**  ----  ---- 0.014** 
  ---- ---- (0.0004) ----  ---- (0.004) 
Central Bank 
Ind. 
---- 0.31*  0.27  ----  2.76  1.98 
  ----  (0.17) (0.17) ----  (1.72) (1.70) 
Vulnerability 
 
(lag 0-6 months) 
---- 0.04  0.04  ----  0.007  0.07 
  ----  (0.04) (0.04) ----  (0.40) (0.40) 
High-level 
political change 
----  -0.06 -0.04 ----  -2.75 -2.33 
  ----  (0.19) (0.19) ----  (2.18) (2.14) 
Constant  0.17*** 0.13  0.14  2.87***  2.89**  3.06*** 
  (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.29) (0.93)  (0.91) 
No. of 
observations 
745 264 262 711  260 258 
No. of groups  97 50 50 97  50 50 









  39Table 4.  Inflation and human capital inequality.  Democratic and non-






D  where 
π the inflation rate is.  Fixed Effects Estimation results. 
Exp. Var.  FE Non-Authoritarian  FE Authoritarian (a) 
Gini (pop. 25+)  -0.27**
  -0.48** -0.57** 0.22  0.41  0.75* 
  (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.39)  (0.45) 
Openness  ---- ---- 0.001**  ----  ----  -0.005 
  ---- ---- (0.0004) ----  ----  (0.004) 
Central Bank 
Ind. 
---- 0.29*  0.24  ----  -0.78  -0.61 
  ---- (0.16)  (0.16)  ----  (1.43)  (1.44) 
Vulnerability 
(0-6 months) 
---- 0.01  0.02  ----  0.20  0.28 
  ---- (0.04)  (0.04)  ----  (0.21)  (0.21) 
High-level 
political change 
---- -0.04  -0.02  ----  -0.55(b) 0.35(b) 
  ---- (0.19)  (0.19)  ----  (1.72)  (1.80) 
Constant  0.20*** 0.18**  0.18**  0.04  0.22  0.11 
  (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.58)  (0.59) 
No. of 
observations 
386 239 237 46  25  25 
No. of groups  44 43 43 8  7  7 
F test  5.33** 4.15** 4.07** 1.02  X(4)=3.7  X(5)=6.2
 
Notes: 
(a)  Because of the lack of variability of some variables within the sample of non-
democratic countries, the last two columns illustrate Random Effect estimation results. 










  40Table 5.  Inflation and human capital inequality.  Developed and less 
developed countries, LDC = 0 and LDC = 1, respectively, 1960-2000.  The 






D  where π the inflation rate is.  Fixed Effects 
(FE) Estimation results. 
Exp. Var.  FE, LDC = 1  FE, LDC = 0 
Gini (pop. 25+)  -0.17**
  -0.53** -0.60** 0.31**  0.53**  0.38** 
  (0.08) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.19)  (0.19) 
Openness  ---- ---- 0.0008  ----  ---- 0.002** 
  ---- ---- (0.0006) ----  ---- (0.0006)
Central Bank 
Ind. 
---- 1.04**  1.02**  ----  -0.14  -0.20 
  ----  (0.39) (0.39) ----  (0.20) (0.19) 
Vulnerability 
(0-6 months) 
---- 0.004  -0.010  ----  0.07  0.05 
  ----  (0.05) (0.06) ----  (0.05) (0.05) 
High-level 
political change 
---- -0.04  -0.03  ----  0.89*  0.88* 
  ----  (0.25) (0.25) ----  (0.50) (0.48) 
Constant  0.21*** 0.06  0.06  -0.006  0.0002 -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.18) (0.18) (0.02) (0.09)  (0.09) 
No. of 
observations 
534 144 144 182  120 118 
No. of groups  73 31 31 21  20 20 
F test  4.62** 4.54** 4.02** 6.80**  3.08** 4.65*** 
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